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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW



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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
CIA/RR MR-48

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THE PATHET LAO AREA

Introduction

The Kingdom of Laos, with its long northwest-southeast extent, has served as a shield protecting pro-Western Thailand from Communist China and North Vietnam. In 1954 the unity of this buffer kingdom was rent as a result of a provision of the Geneva Conference, which granted temporary regroupment areas to the Communist Pathet Lao movement in the two northern Laotian provinces of Phong Saly and Houa Phan (Figure 1).* Possession of these provinces was to be strictly temporary, pending a general political settlement to be effected in 1955 through nationwide elections. Pathet Lao leaders, however, now claim exclusive jurisdiction over the provinces, and all attempts of the Laotian Government to reassert its authority are branded as "attacks" and "violations." On the other hand, attacks of the Vietminh-trained Pathet Lao troops against the Government occur almost daily. In the Muong Peun area of Houa Phan the situation has been described as "critical" by the American Army Attaché at Vientiane. Inconclusive negotiations have been underway since January. The ceasefire agreement of 9 March 1955, as well as the recent (10 October 1955) truce providing that neither side shall reinforce its military strength in the area, has been ineffective. If the present stalemate

^{*}According to the U.S. Board on Geographic Names, the correct name for the province is Houa Phan and that for the town is Sam Neua, although Sam Neua has been popularly used as the provincial name.

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Figure 1. The main street of Sam Neua in Hou Phan, 1953.



Figure 2. Northward view of the rugged mountains between the Nam Hou and the Laos-Vietnam boundary. In this area terrace farming is more in evidence than the prevailing slash-and-burn method.

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in negotiations continues, the Royal Laotian Government will undoubtedly exclude the two provinces of Phong Saly and Houa Phan from the nationwide elections scheduled for 25 December of this year.

Complete domination of the provinces by the Pathets would create two extensions of Communist-controlled territory contiguous with the western border of the Communist Tai-Meo Autonomous Zone. These two extensions, like Scylla and Charybdis, would lie abreast the main route between Luang Prabang and western North Vietnam -- the depression which extends along the Nam Hou (river) to the Plain of Dien Bien Phu, the ill-fated French fortress in the Tai-Meo Autonomous Zone. Since Phong Saly is bordered on the north by China, the situation is especially ominous, representing a further physical consolidation of Communist-controlled territory. Control of Phong Saly would also be a definite psychological gain for the Reds because it would certainly enhance the value of Communist propaganda directed toward Thailand from nearby Ch'e-li, capital of the Tai Autonomous District in southern Yünnan. In Ch'e-li, the Communist leader Pridi Phanomyong could point to Phong Saly as one more step toward the eventual goal -- the taking over of all Thailand by a "Peoples' Regime."

Terrain

Phong Saly and Houa Phan are part of the great massif between the Red River and the Mekong. These mountains form a barrier that makes travel difficult and, to a large extent, isolates the area.

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The elevation of the mountains averages between 3,000 and 6,000 feet, but individual crests rise above the surrounding ridges. Although the predominant trend is northwest-southeast, ridges and spurs extend out in all directions, creating a confused terrain pattern (Figure 2).

In many places the extreme dissection of the mountains is concealed by the mantle of dense subtropical rain forest that covers most of the slopes. The steep slopes are dotted with agricultural clearings that have been abandoned by the mountain tribes and allowed to revert to a second growth of more open forest. The narrow mountain valleys are often deep, almost impassable gorges. The lower slopes of the steep valleys of the major streams are commonly covered with open forest interspersed with areas of grassland. Small plains areas at the mouths of major tributaries and occasionally at higher elevations near the headwaters of streams are prized as natural sites for settlement by some of the ethnic groups of the area.

Climate

Day-to-day existence in northern Laos is geared to the seasonal cycle of the monsoonal climate, in which the rainy summer and dry winter are separated by shorter transitional seasons. The rainy season extends from the middle of May to the end of August. Of the 65.9 inches of rainfall received annually at Phong Saly, 45.8 inches fall during the period from May to September. During their first invasion of Laos in the spring of 1953, the Communist Vietminh were reportedly forced to retreat when they had almost reached the gates

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of Luang Prabang. Because of the heavy rains, their thousands of supply coolies had been bogged down in mud along the jungle trails, leaving front-line troops without rice supplies. The transitional period during September and October is followed by cool, dry weather that continues until February. During this season the days are generally sunny, with cloudless skies, but early-morning fog is common in the mountain valleys. The spring transitional season, lasting from March into May, is characterized by hot days and fairly frequent storms, forerunners of the summer rains.

Temperature data for the Pathet Iao area are not available, but the April mean daily maximum and the January mean daily minimum temperatures for nearby Luang Prabang, at an elevation of 942 feet, are 96°F and 56°F, respectively. Temperatures in the mountain areas are generally about 3° lower for each 1,000 feet of elevation. Transportation

In mountainous country, where travel by path and trail is difficult and tedious, river travel is the "easy way," even though it is often periled by rapids. As might be expected, trade to some extent "flows with the current," and foreign ideologies from the more advanced lowlands may be carried back upstream. It is therefore significant that, although the rivers of Phong Saly flow toward Luang Prabang (traditional residence of the King) and into the Mekong River, the rivers of Houa Phan flow southeastward through the central part of Communist Vietnam to the Gulf of Tonkin. Such orientation might well

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have its effect on the loyalties of the many Houa Phan villages, isolated as they are from Luang Prabang. From 1893 to 1905, part of Houa Phan actually was governed by Annam.

In Phong Saly, the Nam Hou, which joins the Mekong River about 18 miles above Luang Prabang, is the chief riverine artery. Fairly large pirogues (native dugout canoes) navigate the river at all seasons for some 150 miles upstream. Except when the river is in highest flood stage, small pirogues able to carry a payload of 660 pounds can reach Hat Sa, the river port of Phong Saly. On the Nam Hou the flood stage or high-water period lasts from May to September, and low water prevails between December and March. The volume of water may be 20 to 30 times greater at high water than at low water, and its turbulence often makes navigation impossible for small boats.

In Houa Phan the two main navigable rivers are the Song Ca and the Song Ma. Junks can ascend the Song Ca only as far as Cua Rao in North Vietnam, but pirogues can continue through numerous rapids to the vicinity of Muong Peun, within 30 miles of the river's source. The Song Ma is navigable for an unknown distance by pirogues, but they must make their way through many rapids. The high-water stage lasts from August to December on the Song Ca and from July to October on the Song Ma. Low-water stage extends from January to June on the Song Ca and from January to March on the Song Ma.

Transportation by land in this undeveloped mountainous area is largely along trails, by pack animal and coolie. The major trails

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and connecting roads are indicated on the accompanying map, No. 25018. Most of the trails are ephemeral; landslides may block them and flash floods may wash out one or more of the primitive bridges along their courses. Thus, a road that is usable today may be out of commission tomorrow. Trails commonly avoid the major stream valleys, which are too deep and narrow for easy passage, and instead follow the ridges or the valleys of smaller tributaries.

In isolated areas such as Phong Saly and Houa Phan, air transport would be a logical method of maintaining contact with the outside world, but the rugged terrain limits the development of airfields. The airfield 2 miles east of Sam Neua, which has a grass cover over a base of gravel and rolled earth, will accommodate C-47 type planes in the dry season (Figure 3). Most of the other fields -- such as those at Phong Saly, Sam Teu (20°02'N-104°38'E), Sop Hao (20°34'N-104°27'E), and Nong Khang (20°37'N-104°04'E) -- are usable only during the dry season and can accommodate only light planes. The mountains that surround the fields make approach and takeoff hazardous.

Of the estimated 1,300,000 population in Laos, more than 100,000 live in the provinces of Phong Saly (46,200) and Houa Phan (63,300).

People

The population is a veritable mosaic of ethnic groups, subgroups, and tribes. In general, however, the people may be divided into three

major ethnolinguistic groups -- Tai, Indonesian, and Sino-Tibetan.

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Centuries ago the Tai moved southward out of China. In Laos today, they include a large group of Laotian Tai and small groups of so-called Tribal Tai. The latter differ from the Lao Tai in minor dialectical variations and in their places of origin or historical affiliations in China. In general, they are less literate than the





Figure 3. This airstrip under construction in a narrow valley outside the town of Sam Neua will accommodate C-47 type transport planes.

Lao Tai and occupy subordinate positions politically and commercially. Ethnically the Lao Tai are identical with the great group of Laos in northern Thailand, and contact between the two groups of Laos is maintained to some extent through trade and migration across the border. Tribal Tai in the Pathet Lao area are chiefly the Red Tai (Tai Deng), White Tai (Tai Khao), Black Tai (Tai Dam) -- named for the color of the women's clothes -- and the Lu. The first three



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speak closely related dialects and are collectively called Phu Tai.

The Lu speak a dialect showing Burmese and Chinese influences.

Reportedly, almost all of the Tai dialects are mutually intelligible.

In the Pathet Lao area the Lao Tai are found chiefly in a belt extending northward along the banks of the Nam Hou, and the Phu Tai (Red, White, and Black) in southern and western Houa Phan and along its northern border. The Lu occupy a wedgelike area extending southward from the northern border of Phong Saly, as well as isolated areas in the west-central part of the province. The villages of the Lao Tai are in valleys and on gentle slopes; those of the Tribal Tai are usually at low altitudes, but occasionally they may be found at elevations as high as 1,000 feet.

The Indonesian group consists of the Kha,* a name loosely applied to any of the primitive mountain peoples who are not distinctly of the Meo tribe. They speak a Mon-Khmer language, which has many dialectical variations between villages. Where the Kha are in contact with the Tai, Laotian Tai words have been borrowed. The Kha are found throughout large areas of west-central Houa Phan and throughout the southern half of Phong Saly. Traditionally, they have been manual laborers for the more advanced Laotians. Kha villages are generally found at elevations of about 3,000 feet.

^{*&}quot;Kha" is the Laotian word for "savage," and its use is resented by the people. The Laotian term "Puteng," meaning "men of the uplands," is used by the Kha people in referring to themselves.

The Sino-Tibetan group consists of the Meo (Miao) and the Lolos.

The Meo (Figure 4), like the Tai, are divided into a number of tribes,
each having an individual costume for the women, which gives rise to
the names White, Black, Red, and Flowery Meo. The Meo speak a



Figure 4. People of a Meo tribe.

language of the Miao-Yao-Pateng stock. Although they have no written language, they place great value on their oral literature -- chants, songs, and narrative poems. Small groups of Meo are found in the western and southwestern parts of both Phong Saly and Houa

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Phan. In the northeast and southeast of Houa Phan, relatively large areas -- extensions of the Meo stronghold in Xieng Khouang -- are occupied by Meo. The Meo are mountaineers, and their villages are rarely located at levels below 3,000 feet.

The Lolo, known as Ho in Laos, speak a language that differs dialectically from that of the Lolo in Yünnan. Today, many of the Ho speak a Tai dialect, which has become the lingua franca of the hills. They are concentrated largely in an area in north-central Phong Saly. Southwest of the town of Phong Saly are the related Akha (Kho) tribes. The villages of the Ho and Akha are generally at altitudes ranging from 3,000 to 4,500 feet, often displacing Meo villages in the lower areas.

Economy

The economic importance of the Pathet Lao area is negligible, even in the primitive Laotian economy. The agricultural subsistence economy of the mountain tribes is based on a slash-and-burn practice called "rây." The forest is cleared and burned, and crops such as maize, dry mountain rice, tobacco, indigo, squash, cucumbers, taro, bananas, and sweet potatoes are raised for a few years. The Meo, in particular, raise poppies for opium, chiefly as a trade commodity. When the fertility of the soil is exhausted, the tribe moves to a new location and repeats the slash-and-burn technique. Some livestock are raised by all tribes, but the poorer tribes reserve such animals

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for religious ceremonial sacrifice and obtain most of their meat supply by hunting. The lowland Lao bases his economy on rice, which is grown under irrigation in the valleys or on the terraced lower slopes. Total rice production in 1952 was 31,400 tons in Houa Phan and 21,450 tons in Phong Saly. The total of 52,850 tons represents about 10 percent of the total Laotian harvest.

Mineral production is negligible, but there are some deposits of lead, zinc, and pyrites in Houa Phan and of salt, gypsum, copper, coal, iron ore, antimony, and gold in Phong Saly. In the latter province, only salt, gypsum, and copper are present in commercial quantities.

Attitudes

The prejudices of the tribes of the Pathet Lao area are many. From the standpoint of their possible effect upon loyalties toward Luang Prabang, some of these prejudices are of particular interest at this time. The Laotian Tai have a traditional dislike for the Vietnamese. Undoubtedly the 1953 invasion by the Vietminh intensified this feeling. This dislike is probably shared by some of the Tribal Tai. As recently as the spring of 1954, a large group of Red Tai on the southeastern border of Houa Phan cooperated with the French in guerrilla warfare against the Vietminh. On the other side is the possible effect on the Tribal Tai of propaganda from the Vietminhsponsored Tai-Meo Autonomous Zone in nearby North Vietnam. To the freedom-loving Tai mountaineers, disillusionment should come quickly.


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Among the widely spread Kha, who have served as <u>corvees</u> (forced laborers) on the lowland Laotian ricelands, there is often a strong feeling of resentment against the Laotians, which the Communists can be expected to exploit as a divisive medium. The Meo tribes, traditionally fiercely independent, are generally anti-Communist. Meo tribal leaders, such as the almost legendary Touby Lyfoung in nearby Xieng Khouang Province, should exert a strongly anti-Communist influence upon Meos within the Pathet Lao area.

Overshadowing the interplay of all these prejudices is the dismal fact that the Laotian Government is unprepared for a major conflict with the Pathet Lao movement, which would certainly receive logistical support from the Vietminh and Communist China. The Laotian Government, therefore, is faced with a continuing dilemma. Permitting the Pathet Lao to continue their occupation of the two provinces, with less than an all-out attempt to dislodge them, gives the Pathets additional time to achieve complete control of the populace and to improve their military position. On the other hand, calling for a general insurrection of the populace against the Pathet Lao and simultaneously starting an all-out military effort (probably the only chance left to dislodge the Reds) would most certainly involve active conflict with the Vietminh. (SECRET)

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THE GULF OF AQABA



An Emerging Trouble Spot

The Gulf of Aqaba
is rapidly emerging as
a trouble spot in the
Israel-Arab struggle.
Although Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Israel, and
Jordan border the gulf,
only Egypt can be said
to control it, chiefly
because of Egyptian
possession of two small
islands athwart the en-

trance -- Tiran and Sanafir. Before Egypt occupied the islands in 1950, reportedly at the recommendation of German military advisors, both were uninhabited. Although Egypt gave assurance that peaceful passage into the gulf would continue unhampered, observers noted that artillery was moved onto the island of Tiran. Since then the Egyptians have monitored shipping bound for the Jordanian port of Aqaba near the head of the gulf and have at times seemed intent upon stopping British vessels bound for that port. Under these conditions, few vessels have attempted to reach Eilat, the nearby Israeli port.

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The fact that the Gulf of Aqaba remained quiet during this period can be attributed to a combination of factors. The Israeli port of Eilat was little developed and had poor connections with its hinterland. Furthermore, neither Asia nor Africa, the areas most accessible from the port of Eilat, offered markets for Israeli products. The nearby Jordanian port of Aqaba also lacked satisfactory connections with the interior, and consequently most of Jordan's trade was directed to the Mediterranean. Aqaba, however, is more active than Eilat. It is the seat of the only British garrison in the area and has been a port of embarkation for Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Early in 1955, when world attention was focused on the recurrent Gaza incidents, Egypt announced that passage through the Gulf of Aqaba was forbidden to all ships bound for the port of Eilat. Israeli Defense Minister David Ben Gurian promptly gave sharp warning to the Egyptians of the serious consequences that might follow, and the Israeli cabinet was known to be interested in freeing the mouth of the gulf by "suitable means." More important than the threats was the fact that Israel planned to develop a better port with deeper water near Eilat. The Gulf of Aqaba assumed new importance to Israel, which is faced with the necessity for circumventing the Suez blockade and the need for expanding trade in order to bolster the national economy. At the same time the hinterlands began to open up, and Israel began thinking in terms of trade with Asia and Africa.

Jordan also began to show greater interest in the Gulf of Aqaba coincident with the planned revival of the Ma'an (Jordan)-Medina (Saudi Arabia) rail line and the exploitation of phosphates in the interior. The plans will probably include the construction of a branch line to Aqaba to provide an adequate outlet for the minerals of Jordan. (See "Ma-an-Medina Railroad," Geographic Intelligence Review No. 40, April 1954, pp. 40-46.)

Strategic Importance

Although the Gulf of Aqaba is bordered by barren land, it has retained one strategic asset throughout history -- position. The lands to the north, the Israel and Jordan of today, can be reached by way of the gulf. If an enemy controlling these lands launched an attack on the Suez Canal, any counterthrust would probably include an attack northward through the Gulf of Aqaba. These tactics were used in World War I.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century the Sultan of Turkey made an effort to extend his boundary midway across the Sinai Peninsula in order to include all of the Gulf of Aqaba within his territory. But the British ultimately forced the Turks to agree to a boundary between Sinai and Palestine that did not encompass the gulf. In formulating the boundaries of Israel the Zionists, keenly aware of the geographical position of the state, provided for an outlet on the Gulf of Aqaba, as well as at Haifa on the Mediterranean.

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Israel's interest in the Gulf of Aqaba is also closely related to the boundary problem. The present boundaries of Israel are merely armistice lines and will remain unsettled until a treaty of peace is signed with the Arabs. Meanwhile, the expansionist idea is not dormant among Israeli politicians. Like the early Zionist leaders, some of them would place the boundary of Israel eastward far enough to include the Hedjaz railway, which passes through the Hawran of southwestern Syria and continues south into Jordan past Amman to a point south of Ma'an. Israel therefore has a vital interest in the projected reextension of the Hedjaz railway from Ma'an to Medina and an even greater interest in the possible extension of a branch line to Aqaba, which would become an outlet for the minerals of Jordan.

Economic Importance

As a trade route, the Gulf of Aqaba occupies an ironic position. Israel, the nation most actively concerned with unobstructed use of the gulf, has neither an adequate port on the gulf nor commodities to export through such a port. Jordan, the nation with relatively free passage through the gulf to its one port, uses these waters for only a minor portion of its imports and for almost none of its exports. These situations, however, could change. In the case of Jordan, a change is actually in progress. In the case of Israel, exploratory work is underway, but the economic aspects of the problem have not yet taken shape.

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The Gulf of Aqaba's hinterlands -- whether in Sinai, Saudi
Arabia, the Negev of Israel, or southern Jordan -- are all alike in
lacking proved economically exploitable mineral deposits, population
in numbers sufficient to provide markets, and satisfactory transportation. Agriculturally the hinterland is equally barren. Along the
southern part of the gulf the mountains that border the coasts of
Sinai and Saudi Arabia extend inland over 50 miles. Farther north
the barren, heavily dissected plateaus of both nations extend
northward into Israel and Jordan.

Agricultural possibilities of southern Israel are slight, despite the much publicized plans for agricultural development in the Negev. In the area south of Beersheba, the Negev receives less than 4 inches of rainfall annually and to the north only slightly more. In the entire Negev there are only 250,000 acres of true soil according to the most optimistic estimate, whereas nearly 10 times as many acres are too stony or salty for cultivation or are dune covered. Without large-scale mineral exploitation, an environment of this type would scarcely attract enough population to justify converting Eilat into a deep-water port.

In the case of Jordan, phosphate deposits in the interior could be exported through Aqaba if transportation were improved. As long as the phosphate deposits remained unexploited, however, there was little reason to develop the port. Furthermore, Aqaba is Jordan's only port, but hinterland connections have been so poor that trade

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has been directed largely to Beirut, Lebanon. In 1953, exports from Aqaba amounted to only 3,500 tons out of a total of 50,000 for the entire country; imports normally amount to about 70,000 tons out of a total of 260,000 to 300,000. The exploitation of mineral deposits of the interior coincides with the idea of extending a branch rail line from Ma'an to Aqaba. Even with present poor connections to the hinterland, cargo unloaded at Aqaba reaches Amman, the chief population center, in 2 days, whereas cargo unloaded at Beirut takes 10 days (see Map 13890).

As of May 1955 the proposed expansion of the port of Aqaba was nearing the end of the planning stage. Two quays costing nearly 3 million dollars were planned, and construction time was estimated at 2 to 3 years. The phosphate quay was planned to handle 1 million tons per year, the cargo quay a mere 200,000 tons. Clearly, Aqaba is being developed as a raw-material shipping port.


The neighboring Israeli port of Eilat at present has an estimated 500 civilians, but plans call for a future population of 15,000 to 20,000, depending upon the extent of development within the Negev. Eilat today is actually a military settlement with better housing and recreational facilities than similar settlements elsewhere in Israel. Although fishing is the only economic activity of the town, the small fishmeal factory is not currently in operation. Under these circumstances, speculation is aroused by the recent launching of two "fishing vessels" -- Tiran and Sanafir -- by Achdut Avoda, the

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left-wing activist political party favoring a strong line against the Arabs.

The development of a satisfactory port at Eilat poses difficulties. In Israel the terrain at the head of the gulf consists of a flat beach 2 kilometers long and a 9-kilometer stretch where the mountains of Sinai border the shore. Although offshore conditions along this mountainous stretch present port possibilities, storage space is lacking. The flat northern stretch has offshore reefs that endanger approach by ship, and nearshore waters are shallow. From an engineering standpoint, it is both difficult and expensive to compensate for these disadvantages. Two years ago it was stated that construction of an open wharf 150 meters from the present shoreline was the only solution; no later information is available.

The development of ports at both Eilat and Aqaba might raise serious boundary problems that thus far have pass unnoticed. United Nations and Israeli interpretations of the Armistice Line differ radically. According to the United Nations interpretation, Eilat is left with flat terrain a mere half kilometer in width for the landward part of its port. At the time the Armistice Line between Israel and Jordan was agreed upon, the United Nations negotiators were supplied with the wrong map and erroneous data. (For further details, see "The Israel-Jordan Armistice Line," Geographic Intelligence Review No. 40, April 1954.)



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Thus, the Gulf of Aqaba area presents two threats to the peace of the Near East. The development of the Israeli port near Eilat may raise new boundary problems, with resultant "incidents." There is also danger that Egypt may do what the Turks failed to accomplish -- convert the Gulf of Aqaba into a closed sea -- and so control both economic and military access to Israel and Jordan from the south. (CONFIDENTIAL)

STATUS OF THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE

After protracted negotiations, the Italian-Yugoslav dispute over the Free Territory of Trieste was provisionally settled in London on 5 October 1954. The agreement -- entitled "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia Regarding the Free Territory of Trieste" -- provides that the future civil administration of the area will be divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. Italy has taken over Zone A from the Allied Military Government, which had administered the Zone since the end of the war; the task of administering a slightly augmented Zone B will continue to rest with Yugloslavia. The city of Trieste remains within the Italian sector but will retain free-port facilities.

Since the memorandum of understanding does not alter the <u>de jure</u> political status of the Free Territory of Trieste, which is provided for in the Italian Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947, neither Italy nor Yugoslavia has legal sovereignty over its respective sector. No limit, however, is set by the memorandum to the duration of the <u>de</u> facto administration.

The discrepancy between the legal and actual situations is complicated by actions of the Italians and Yugoslavs. Although technically the Free Territory of Trieste is still an international area, the boundary lines separating Italy and Yugoslavia from their

respective sectors of civil administration are not international boundaries in actual practice. This is especially true of Yugoslavia, where the former Zone B districts of Koper (Capodistria) and Buje (Buie) have been administratively incorporated into the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, respectively. This situation is already reflected in statistics and on maps published by Yugoslavia. The situation in Italy is somewhat different since, for political reasons, the government must emphasize the provisional aspects of the settlement. Therefore, Italy has not made a similar effort to integrate its sector of the Free Territory into its administrative framework. The boundary separating the two, however, seems to lack customs stations and consequently cannot be regarded as truly international.

A cartographic solution of this problem for maps of wide distribution would involve the representation of the <u>de facto</u> situation within a framework of <u>de jure</u> boundaries. There will be an increasing tendency for maps of Yugoslavia and Italy to contain information on their respective civil zones. On a recent map of Yugoslav administrative divisions (CIA 13681, 4-55) the Yugoslav-administered districts were included, together with an international boundary line separating them from Yugoslavia. With one modification, the procedure used on Map 13681 seems the most suitable for maps of both Italy and Yugoslavia. To indicate the international character of the Free Territory of Trieste, the boundary between the two zones should be a provisional

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line rather than an international line. Besides being technically correct, particularly if the notations "limit of Italian [or Yugoslav] administration" are added along the provisional line separating the sectors, the procedure would make alteration of existing maps relatively simple. This approach may be necessary to prevent duplication of mapping in the NIS program, wherein the entire Free Territory is included with Italy.

The few maps that might require representation of the <u>de facto</u> situation, including boundaries, should be for limited distribution only since the Free Territory of Trieste would not appear as an international entity. Even so, it would be advisable to add a standard disclaimer. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN

The dream of the late Mohammed Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan, visualized a united Muslim country untorn by interprovincial strife. In a move intended to bring this goal closer to realization, an Order of the Governor-General of Pakistan was issued on 5 October 1955, under which the various political divisions that comprised West Pakistan (with the exception of the Federal Capital Area of Karāchi) were to be merged into the single Province of West Pakistan, effective 14 October. Since the merger includes the Pushtoon areas of Pakistan, the possibility of violent reactions had been anticipated from Afghanistan, which had been agitating for an independent Pushtoonistan. The only formal protest to date, however, has been the recall of the Afghan chargé from Karāchi.

Prior to the merger the political divisions of West Pakistan were:

- 1. Governors' Provinces
 - a. Punjab
 - b. Sind
 - c. North-West Frontier
- 2. Chief Commissioners' Provinces
 - a. Baluchistān
 - b. Karāchi (formally known as the Karāchi Federal Capital Area)

3. Princely States

- a. Bahawalpur
- b. Khairpur
- c. Baluchistān States Union
- d. Dīr
- e. Swāt
- f. Chitral

4. Miscellaneous political units

- a. The 2 small states of Amb and Phulra, which had been closely allied with the North-West Frontier Province.
- b. Tribal areas and agencies, which are found chiefly in the North-West Frontier and Baluchistān areas.

The new Province of West Pakistan includes 10 Divisions, each of which will be administered by a Commissioner. The capital of the Province will be at Lahore in the Punjab. The Federal Capital Area of Karāchi will continue to be centrally administered. Although it will send its representatives to the Province of West Pakistan Legislative Assembly, the Capital Area will not be affected by the laws passed by the Assembly. Thus the entire national administrative structure of the country now consists of the two units of West Pakistan and East Bengal (East Pakistan), which has 3 Divisions.

Current information relevant to the details of the change is not complete and includes apparent contradictions concerning the components

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of the new divisions. The accompanying map (No. 25076) indicates, by a magenta overprint on the 1951 administrative divisions, the approximate boundaries of the new divisions. This map should be considered provisional and is subject to revision upon receipt of additional information.

According to information received from Pakistan, the 10 Divisions and the areas included in each follow:

Division	Areas Included


- 1. Peshāwar The districts of Peshāwar, Mardān,
 Hazāra, and Campbellpur; the Tribal
 Areas attached to the districts of
 Peshāwar, Mardān, and Hazāra; and
 the Agencies of Malakand, Mohmand,
 and Khyber.
- 2. Dera Ismāīl Khān The districts of Dera Ismāīl Khān, Bānnu, Kohāt, and Miānwāli; the Tribal Areas attached to the districts of Dera Ismāīl Khān, Bānnu, and Kohāt; and the Agencies of Kurram and North Wazīristān.
- 3. Rāwalpindi The districts of Rāwalpindi, Jhelum, Gujrāt, and Shāhpur.

Lahore The districts of Lahore, Shekhupura, Gujrānwala, and Siālkot. 5. Multan The districts of Multan, Jhang, Lyallpur, and Montgomery. 6. Bahāwalpur The districts of Bahāwalpur, Bahāwalnagar, Rahīmyar Khān, Muzaffargarh, and Dera Ghāzi Khān. 7. Khairpur The State of Khairpur and the districts of Jacobābād, Sukkur, Lārkāna, and Nawabshah. 8. Hyderābād The districts of Hyderabad, Thatta, Dadu, Mirpurkhas, and Sanghar. Quetta The Agencies of Quetta, Zhob, Loralai, and Sibi. 10. Kalāt Baluchistān States Union and Chāgai.

The Tribal Areas of Baluchistān and the North-West Frontier

Province as well as the States of Amb, Chitrāl, Dīr, and Swāt have been designated as "special areas." There will be no change in the internal administration of these units.

Through the establishment of the new province the Pakistani hope to create a country that will be politically more coherent and economically more nearly viable. Politically, it is hoped that the merger will facilitate agreement with East Pakistan -- separated from West



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Pakistan by 1,000 miles of Indian territory -- as to the future pattern of the nation's government. Economically, it is expected that the merger will result in an easier flow of trade, including food, between the east and west and a general improvement in the pooling of their resources for the welfare of the nation as a whole. (UNCLASSIFIED)

NEW CHART OF STATIONS IN ANTARCTICA FOR THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR

A chart of Antarctica published in October 1955 by the U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office* provides a clear, up-to-date portrayal of the locations of stations that will be manned by different countries during the International Geophysical Year (IGY), 1957-58. Also shown, are the projected route and the way stations to be used by the United States during the 1955-56 season in flying supplies to the Antarctic for eventual use at U.S.-manned stations.

The IGY program, in which some 40 nations will cooperate, envisages, inter alia, four chains of observation stations, three extending from the North to the South Pole and the fourth around the Equator.

The Antarctic is vital to the program as a critical meeting point of three chains, and also because it includes heretofore unexplored areas from which data must be obtained if various research objectives are to be achieved. To make the south polar net as complete as possible, 10 nations (the United States, Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the USSR) will man some 24 stations on the Antarctic Continent and numerous other stations in adjacent areas. The main fields for the coordinated

^{*}Antarctic Area Stations - U.S. Navy Operation "Deepfreeze" 1955-56 and International Geophysical Year 1957-58; available at two scales, 1:11,250,000 and 1:27,500,000; second edition, 27 October 1955, distributed by U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office as H:O. 16429 (small-scale edition H.O. 16429A).

collection of data will be ionosphere physics, cosmic rays, meteorology, gravity measurement, oceanography, geomagnetism, glaciology, seismology, aurora and airglow, solar activity, and latitude and longitude determination. It is expected that some of the participating countries will also undertake independent work in fields that do not fall specifically within the scope of the IGY -- e.g., hydrography, topographic mapping, biology, and certain phases of geology.

On the Hydrographic Office chart, IGY station information is overprinted in red on a black-and-white reproduction of the latest edition of H.O. 2562. This chart, which covers all of Antarctica, gives the best available small-scale (1:11,250,000) representation of the coastal areas in which many of the IGY stations will be located. Distinctive symbols identify stations and indicate date of occupation, and a marginal index lists stations by number under the names of sponsoring countries. On the map, some of the stations are indicated as subject to change in latitude or longitude. Actually, all of the station locations are still approximate and subject to change. It should also be noted that the Soviet continental station will be located at 82°S, not at 80°S as indicated on the map.*

^{*}The mistake apparently stems from a typographical error appearing in the English translation of the original Soviet list of stations that was submitted at Brussels in September 1955.

From the location of the stations it is apparent that most of them lie within areas that the sponsoring countries have claimed officially. The exceptions are (1) the three USSR stations, which will be in the very large and mostly unexplored sector claimed by Australia; (2) the Japanese station, which is to be located within the limits of the Norwegian claim; and (3) the U.S. stations, which are located either in an unclaimed area or in areas claimed by other nations.

The station pattern also highlights the rivalry of Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom in the Palmer Peninsula region. With 8 United Kingdom, 8 Argentine, and 4 Chilean stations, this area and adjacent islands will be the best-covered section of Antarctica.


Preparations for the Antarctic phase of the IGY are already underway although the bulk of the observations for the "Year" will not begin until August 1957. The new station chart and such revised editions as may appear at later dates will be valuable aids in following the development of the program. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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ANTARCTIC AERIAL SURVEY

A forthcoming aerial survey of "Grahamland"* and the adjacent islands of the Falkland Island Dependencies was announced in June

1955 by



1955 by the British Colonial
Office. The survey, which is
intended to provide information
for assessing the scientific
and mineral potentials of the
area, will start late in 1955
and continue through the Antarctic summer. It was noted
that thousands of square miles
are to be photographed, but the
specific areas to be covered were
not indicated. The announcement
mentioned plans for the production of a "mosaic of air photographs," this and all other

photographic work to be done on contract by a private aerial-photography firm in the United Kingdom.

^{*}British sources generally designate as "Grahamland" the area shown on U.S. maps as "Palmer Peninsula." The U.S. Board on Geographic Names does not accept "Grahamland," but recognizes the name "Graham Coast" for a section of the Palmer Peninsula.

Announcement of the projected survey was accompanied by mention of plans for assigning a second supply vessel to Antarctic service.

This ship is to be used to assist the research vessel <u>John Biscoe</u> in maintaining the present eight Antarctic bases of the Falkland

Island Dependencies "and possibly to establish further bases."

The initiation of an aerial survey and the projected assignment of an additional supply vessel to the Antarctic are in line with recent British efforts to step up their exploratory work in the Palmer Peninsula area so as to strengthen their claim to this territory -- a claim vehemently disputed by both Argentina and Chile. (UNCLAS-SIFIED)

NEW BULGARIAN RAILROAD MAP AND TIMETABLE

The acquisition of a 1954 railroad map and timetable for Bulgaria helps fill a sizable intelligence gap, since little official information on the railroads of that country has been received in recent years.

A color reproduction of the official Bulgarian map, Narodna Republika Bulgariya Karta na Zhelezoputnite Linii (People's Republic of Bulgaria, Map of Railroad Lines), published in Sofia in 1954 by GUGK (Main Administration for Geodesy and Cartography), is available on loan from the CIA Map Library (Call No. 96974-R). In making the reproduction, the scale was reduced from 1:750,000 to approximately 1:1,000,000. The railroad lines in operation are differentiated according to three gauges in use (standard; 760-mm narrow; and 600-mm narrow) and by railroad administration zone. An alphabetical directory of approximately 700 railroad stations and stops is provided and is keyed to the atlas grid of the map. Although the directory of stations is not identical with that of the timetable in completeness and orthography, the two are in close enough agreement to permit cross-referencing between the map and route schedules. In reproduction, some of the place names on the map were in part obliterated and scale distortions were introduced. The original map had been folded, and the creases were not completely removed before the map was photographed for color separation. Furthermore, a narrow-gauge branch railroad line between

Kocherinovo and Rilski Manastir was "lost" in the reproduction process.

Despite these limitations the map is of considerable intelligence

value since it gives the approximate location of all railroad stations and stops in Bulgaria.

A photocopy of the timetable, Ofitsialen Putevodital (Official Guide), issued by the Ministry of Transportation in May 1954, is also available (CIA Map Library Call No. tF542). The guide includes schedules for railroad, water, and air transportation. The station names appear both in Bulgarian and in the Roman alphabet. Explanatory notes for using the guide are given in Bulgarian and French. The alphabetical list of railroad stations and stops included in the guide has incidental intelligence value as an up-to-date supplement to available gazetteers, since it provides a partial list of official Bulgarian place-name spellings. The places listed can, in turn, be located on the 1954 railroad map. (CONFIDENTIAL)

A NEW AGRICULTURAL GEOGRAPHY OF HUNGARY

A valuable collection of current information on the agricultural geography of Hungary has recently been made available to the U.S. intelligence community through the acquisition of Magyororoszág Mezőgazdasági Földrajza.* This 179-page study, written by Dr. László Görög during the "new course" era of former premier Imre Nagy, was published in a limited edition by the Tervgazdasági Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1954. Apparently it was designed primarily for the use of three groups -- advanced agricultural students, the planning section of the Ministry of Agriculture, and managers and planners of state farms and cooperatives.

The book is divided into 12 chapters. Included in the early chapters are discussions of the concept and scope of agricultural geography and critiques of several noted Hungarian agricultural studies. One chapter gives an insight into the shift in agricultural emphasis in terms of land ownership, the distribution and productivity of arable land, the distribution of various kinds of animals, and the development of farm mechanization during the period 1935-53. In later chapters the distribution and production of major crops and different types of livestock are analyzed individually on the basis of the 1951-52 and 1952-53 agricultural years. Natural and economic

^{*}CIA Library Call No. 37M/6 621.8 M2.

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factors influencing the distribution of farm production are also discussed in detail in separate chapters. The volume concludes with a discussion of geographic planning in agriculture, and several examples are given of the effect of agro-geographic factors.

A meteorological supplement gives climatic data in tabular form for each of the climatic regions of Hungary. Accompanying these are textual descriptions of climatic conditions by months for the 1951-52 and 1952-53 agricultural years.

Of particular value from the standpoint of geographic intelligence are 72 accompanying maps and graphs based for the most part on the 1951-52 sowing year and 1952-53 harvest year. The maps, which are in a folder in the back cover, are multicolored, easily readable, and cover the whole country at a scale of 1:1,250,000. Although a majority of them give the boundaries of first- and second-order civil divisions, a transparent administrative overlay keyed to an accompanying administrative list is also provided to aid interpretation of data on individual districts. The group includes a map for each of 28 crops showing the percentage of arable land devoted to it and relative yields by district. Another shows by colors and line patterns the four major crops of each district. Land utilization, extent of farm mechanization, distribution of arable land, and soil types are individually illustrated. The climatic maps include climatic zones, mean last date of spring frost, mean yearly number of hours of sunshine, average summer precipitation, and average temperatures during

the growing season. Together the maps provide the latest and best Hungarian agricultural map coverage available in the United States. (UNCLASSIFIED)

ATLAS GENERAL DU CONGO ET RUANDA-URUNDI

Six additional maps for the looseleaf Atlas Général du Congo et Ruanda-Urundi (CIA Call No. a E302.15, 1948) have recently been received. These maps supplement those previously received, which are listed in Map Research Bulletin No. 27, September 1951, and Map Intelligence Review No. 36, May 1953. The new maps are: (1) Carte des Missions Protestantes; (2) Carte Géodésique; (3) Carte Nosologique; (4) Carte des Télécommunications; (5) Carte Linguistique; and (6) Carte des Zones Climatiques. Three others -- (1) Carte des Campagnes Antiesclavagistes, (2) Carte des Productions Végétales, and (3) Carte des Frontières -- were received between May 1953 and August 1955. All were published by the Académie Royale des Sciences Coloniales (formerly the Institut Royal Colonial Belge) and are in color and at the scale of 1:5,000,000. Like the earlier maps, each of the new maps is accompanied by several pages of descriptive text in French and Flemish. At present, the atlas includes a total of 22 maps in 20 folders. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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